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Discussion of
Analyzing Speech to Detect
Financial Misreporting
F E N G L I ∗
1. Introduction
One of the most important tasks facing investors, auditors, and regulators
is to identify misreporting by managers, preferably using ex ante signals.
Hobson, Mayew, and Venkatachalam [2012] (henceforth, HMV) examine
the use of CEOs’ voice markers of cognitive dissonance for detecting fi-
nancial misreporting. Prior research on financial misreporting detection
has focused mostly on financial measures, and, more recently, nonfinan-
cial performance measures. HMV innovate by bringing a new perspective
into this field. They motivate this research question with the findings in the
psychology literature that nonverbal vocal markers can help discriminate
deceivers from truth tellers. They focus on a specific type of vocal marker
in the paper—cognitive dissonance—based on prior evidence (e.g., Mazar,
Amir, and Ariely [2008]) that misreporting leads to cognitive dissonance,
which is the feeling of psychological discomfort when one’s actions and
beliefs are discrepant.
To measure managers’ cognitive dissonance, HMV rely on a proprietary
software package, Layered Voice Analysis (LVA). The first step in the empir-
ical tests is to validate the measure as capturing cognitive dissonance. They
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utilize an experimental setting in which they induce misreporting behavior
by lab subjects. They then calibrate the amount of cognitive dissonance for
the subjects and examine whether it is correlated with the cognitive disso-
nance measure based on LVA. The results indicate that the LVA indicators
are indeed positively associated with cognitive dissonance. In the second
step, HMV use archival data and find that the cognitive dissonance exhib-
ited by CEOs during conference calls positively predicts future irregular
restatements.
HMV address an important research question with an innovative ap-
proach. Although there are numerous studies in the accounting literature
that predict financial misreporting, they mostly focus on financial data (De-
chow et al. [2011]), nonfinancial performance data (Brazel, Jones, and
Zimbelman [2009]), or verbal cues (Larcker and Zakolyukina [2012]).
Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that practitioners (e.g., the CIA)
have been using nonverbal cues to detect financial fraud, suggesting that
nonverbal cues could be useful in such a setting. HMV are the first to exam-
ine nonverbal cues from conference calls to detect financial misreporting.
The use of both lab experiments and archival data in the empirical tests is
also unique.
In this discussion, I focus on three aspects. First, I discuss some possible
alternative explanations of the findings in HMV. In particular, it is possible
that the cognitive dissonance metric in the paper captures other psycholog-
ical features, rather than cognitive dissonance per se. Next, I discuss sample
selection issues with the empirical tests and their implications. Lastly, I dis-
cuss possible future research opportunities.
2. Alternative Explanations
Due to data limitation and other constraints, HMV cannot completely
rule out alternative explanations based on their research design. In par-
ticular, the biggest challenge to interpreting the results is what the LVA
marker captures conceptually and whether it indeed measures cognitive
dissonance. From a pure practical and utilitarian perspective (e.g., help-
ing analysts and investors detect possible financial misreporting), this is
not a serious concern. However, from a theoretical perspective, this dis-
tinction is an important one since it influences how we understand and
interpret the evidence. Moreover, it will affect how the literature proceeds.
I discuss some alternative interpretations of the empirical results in this
section.
2.1 FEAR
HMV correctly point out that a necessary condition for them to observe
valid evidence consistent with their hypothesis is that the vocal dissonance
markers based on the LVA software must capture cognitive dissonance stem-
ming from misreporting without significant measurement error. The lab
experiments in HMV are designed to validate this assumption.
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FIG. 1.—The links between fear, cognitive dissonance, and misreporting in conference
call setting.
The cognitive dissonance theory, developed by Festinger [1957], is about
the relationships among the different cognitions human beings have. The
cognitions may be the knowledge about an attitude, an emotion, a behavior,
a value, etc. When people hold a multitude of cognitions simultaneously,
these cognitions could be dissonant or inconsistent with one another. Cog-
nitive dissonance is the tense feeling that occurs when a person holds two
equally valid but conflicting views (Festinger [1957], Aronson [1997]).
Misreporting could lead to cognitive dissonance because the behavior
of misreporting is inconsistent with people’s belief that they are honest.
However, it is possible that other psychological characteristics and cognitive
dissonance might be codetermined and these other characteristics could
potentially explain the empirical results. There are many other different
types of nonverbal cues that might relate to misreporting, such as the fear
of being detected and the consequences associated with being detected. In
other words, when a person misreports, she is also likely to be fearful of the
potential consequences that may arise from being caught.
Aware of the confounding fear factor, HMV design their experiment in
such a way that the experiment subjects retain their test sheets; as a result,
they do not feel fearful of being detected. By doing so, HMV can attribute
the observed cognitive dissonance based on the LVA software to the cogni-
tive dissonance induced by the research design.
However, this design does not rule out the possibility that the LVA cog-
nitive dissonance marker also captures the feeling of fear or other psycho-
logical traits (i.e., “A causes B” does not mean that “B cannot be caused by
C.”) The lab experiments in HMV demonstrate that cognitive dissonance
leads to a high LVA dissonance marker, which by design cannot be due to
the subjects’ fear of being caught. However, as illustrated in figure 1, in a
conference call setting, a high LVA cognitive dissonance marker may be
caused either by the CEOs’ cognitive dissonance or by their fear of being
detected. The key difference between the HMV lab setting and the confer-
ence call setting is that, in the conference call settings, the CEOs are likely
to be fearful (in addition to potentially having cognitive dissonance).
To summarize, the experiments in HMV nicely show that the LVAmarker
indeed captures cognitive dissonance, but they do not show whether (or
how much) it also captures other psychological characteristics such as fear
of detection. Given the proprietary nature of the LVA software, it is difficult
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for researchers to assess whether it captures cognitive dissonance only. The
possibility that CEOs’ fear of being caught and other psychological traits po-
tentially captured by the LVA dissonance marker may explain the archival
findings documented by HMV is an important alternative explanation. This
is especially important given that fear of being caught and deterrence are
the central focus in the economic theory of crime (Tullock [1974], Levitt
[1998]).
2.2 UNCERTAINTY
Cognitive dissonance is likely to be more severe when human beings
face more uncertainty in their decision-making process (Le´vy-Garboua and
Blondel [2002]). Uncertainty can relate to cognitive dissonance in two
ways. First, as HMV point out, uncertainty can cause managers to have
cognitive dissonance. This is because, in a more uncertain environment,
a firm’s performance is less predictable and the performance may not be
consonant with the beliefs held by the manger (e.g., the belief that hard
work leads to better performance). Second, the observed high LVA cogni-
tive dissonance score may capture a CEO’s other responses to uncertainty
(e.g., anxiety or revision of beliefs), rather than her cognitive dissonance.
Note that HMV are aware of the first issue. Because their research ques-
tion is about whether misreporting-related cognitive dissonance is useful
for detecting misreporting, HMV control for uncertain environments using
firm size and stock return volatility to isolate the effect of the component
of the CEO’s cognitive dissonance that is due to misreporting.
However, the second issue, that the LVA measure could capture man-
agers’ other responses to uncertainty, rather than their cognitive disso-
nance, could lead to another possible alternative explanation of the re-
sults. Specifically, the results in HMV are also consistent with the following:
(1) firms with more business or information uncertainty are more likely to
commit financial fraud and get caught, and (2) CEOs of such firms face
more scrutiny in conference calls and, when this happens, the CEOs are
reminded of the uncertainty and the LVA marker picks up their response
to such uncertainty.
This alternative interpretation argues that the link between misreporting
and the LVA marker is not driven by the cognitive dissonance due to misre-
porting. Rather, the positive association between misreporting and the LVA
measure are both determined by uncertainty. Under this interpretation, it is
not enough to control for observable uncertainty measures (such as return
volatility) in the empirical tests because the LVA dissonance marker could
be a better measure of CEOs’ reaction to uncertainty than the uncertainty
variables.
3. Selection Issues
I discuss two sample selection issues with the empirical tests. It is impor-
tant to note that these two selection issues are not caveats for HMV alone;
rather, they are common issues in the literature.
SPEECH AND FINANCIAL MISREPORTING 397
The first sample selection issue is related to the subjects in the lab exper-
iment. To examine the construct validity of the LVA marker as a measure
for cognitive dissonance in a conference call setting, the ideal experiment
should mimic the conference call environment. Concerns about selection
arise here because the subjects in the HMV experiment, who were students
from two large public universities and voluntarily signed up for the exper-
iments, may not represent the CEOs in terms of psychological behavior.
Therefore, the validation conclusion based on the lab experiments may
not be generalizable to CEOs in the conference call settings. Of course,
this external validity concern applies to most lab experiments in the ac-
counting literature, but it may be more significant in the HMV setting. This
is because, compared to the average population, CEOs are more successful;
they are perhaps more overconfident, and have better speech training and
therefore are less subject to cognitive dissonance.
If the LVA dissonance marker does capture CEO cognitive dissonance
in the conference calls, then this sample selection issue is not a big con-
cern because it biases against finding significant results in the archival
tests. In other words, if the CEOs have relatively little cognitive bias, this
implies smaller variation in the observed cognitive dissonance and lower
power for detecting misreporting. However, the bigger concern is that, if
the LVA marker also captures other characteristics of the speaker (e.g., fear
as discussed in the previous section), then it may capture cognitive disso-
nance for the students in the laboratory setting but something else for the
CEOs because of the fundamental differences between the two groups of
people.
The second selection issue relates to the archival tests. Specifically,
HMV gather financial misreporting from the Audit Analytics restatements
database and differentiate intentional (i.e., irregularities) from uninten-
tional (i.e., errors) restatements. In the empirical tests, HMV focus on the
irregular restatements. The selection issue arises because the firms that
were caught for misreporting (i.e., the restatement firms) may not rep-
resent the true population of firms that misreport. Specifically, the firms
that were caught for misreporting may have managers who are bad at lying;
therefore, such CEOs tend to have higher cognitive dissonance scores in
conference calls.
An implication of this selection bias is that cognitive dissonance may be
useful for detecting the “bad cheaters,” but may be of limited power for
catching the “good cheaters” who don’t show up in the restatement sample.
The importance of this sample selection issue is a function of the research
objective. If the objective is to quickly detect financial misreporting (e.g.,
before the SEC catches the misreporting), then this sample selection issue
does not matter because the LVA software can potentially catch the mis-
reporters that would most likely be caught in the future in a more timely
fashion. If, on the other hand, the research objective is to detect all the
misreporters (regardless of whether they are caught and have to restate the
numbers), then the selection bias in the sample is a caveat of the study
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because the empirical results do not speak about the entire misreporting
sample.
4. Future Research
HMV provides very interesting evidence suggesting that cognitive disso-
nance markers could be used to detect financial misreporting. This opens
up many possibilities for future research.1
4.1 EXTENSION OF HMV
A nice and distinctive feature of HMV is that it combines the validity
check using a lab setting and the archival empirical study based on the
validated measure. Future research could extend HMV in both the experi-
mental part and the archival tests part.
One direction for future research could be to more carefully examine
what drives the LVA cognitive dissonance marker in a lab setting to fur-
ther examine its construct validity. As discussed above, by design the exper-
iments in HMV cannot test whether (or how much of) the LVA cognitive
dissonance marker can be driven by the fear of detection. It might be inter-
esting to intentionally introduce fear and variation in other psychological
traits (such as overconfidence) in the experiments to examine how much
of the variation in the LVA dissonance marker is due to these other factors.
Another possible direction is to examine the interaction of the nonverbal
cues, as examined by HMV, and the verbal cues and how they complement
each other and help jointly detect financial misreporting. Current research
examines the financial statement information, verbal cues, and nonverbal
cues separately to detect financial fraud. HMV find that the cognitive dis-
sonance markers play an incremental role to the verbal cues and financial
statement data. Therefore, a model that includes all three pieces of infor-
mation is likely to have increased power for empirical tests.
In addition, because of the limited availability of the conference call
audio files, it is challenging to conduct archival empirical tests exploring
cognitive dissonance using such data. It is therefore interesting to explore
whether verbal cues can also be used to capture managerial cognitive disso-
nance.
Further, future research can extend HMV by utilizing the fraud trian-
gle framework (Turner, Mock, and Srivastava [2003]). The fraud trian-
gle theory argues that three conditions are generally present when fraud
occurs: Incentive/Pressure, Opportunity, and Attitude/Rationalizations.
The cognitive dissonance studied in HMV is closely related to the “At-
titude/Rationalizations” component. Combining the dissonance marker
with the variations in incentives and opportunities to detect financial mis-
reporting could be fruitful for future research.
1 One technical difficulty for follow-up studies is that the audio files of conference calls are
not easily available to researchers.
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4.2 NOVELTY-BASED DETECTION
Human beings adapt to their environment. If a CEO knows that her ver-
bal or nonverbal cues may reveal her misreporting behavior, she can inten-
tionally change her behavior through training. In addition, as discussed in
the previous section, “good cheaters” may be good at controlling cognitive
dissonance and therefore traditional techniques used to detect cognitive
dissonance may have low power for such people.
A possible direction for future research is then to build on the novelty
detection concept in psychiatry and explore the verbal and nonverbal cues
of market participants in settings where novel information is presented to
these participants to detect misreporting. Novel information represents a
deviation from the expected likelihood of an event on the basis of both
previous information and internal estimates of conditional probabilities.
Psychiatry research has documented that human brains respond to novel
information and this response can happen without the subjects’ awareness
(Berns, Cohen, and Mintun [1997]).
The novelty detection literature suggests that researchers should look
for “surprises” in conference call or other settings to search for cogni-
tive dissonance markers. In other words, focusing on the cognitive disso-
nance caused by novel information instead of the average cognitive disso-
nance throughout the conference call may increase the detection power.
For instance, when analysts ask a CEO an unexpected question or a ques-
tion related to earnings quality, the CEO’s cognitive dissonance induced
by misreporting may be substantially higher (even if she is not aware of
it). Therefore, by focusing on the novel information researchers may be
able to better measure and exploit the cognitive dissonance to detect
misreporting.
4.3 ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
Future research might also study the economic consequences of cogni-
tive dissonance more systematically. Akerlof and Dickens [1982] modify the
traditional rational decision-making model and construct a decision model
by incorporating cognitive dissonance. They show that several seemingly
puzzling economic phenomena can be explained when a person’s cogni-
tive dissonance is taken into consideration.
The evidence in HMV suggests that the LVA marker is a valid measure of
cognitive dissonance. This measure can be used to study the economic con-
sequences of managerial cognitive dissonance. While the evidence in HMV
suggests that CEOs who misreport have cognitive dissonance, the next step
is to examine whether the cognitive dissonance has implications for man-
agerial decision making. For instance, when a CEO makes acquisitions us-
ing her firm’s overvalued equity, she may experience some sort of cognitive
dissonance. The implications of this cognitive dissonance for the postacqui-
sition performance are interesting to examine.
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5. Conclusion
HMV show that CEOs’ cognitive dissonance can be used to predict fi-
nancial misreporting. Their study is innovative and addresses an important
question. The evidence in HMV both makes a theoretical contribution and
has practical implications. From a theoretical perspective, HMV demon-
strate that nonverbal cues can have incremental predictive power to detect
financial misreporting and that incorporating managerial cognitive disso-
nance could be useful in future theoretical modeling of corporate decision
making. From a practical perspective, HMV demonstrate that utilizing the
nonverbal cues in conference calls may provide additional information for
investors, auditors, and regulators to detect financial misreporting.
Future research is needed to further validate the LVA software-based cog-
nitive dissonancemarker. The use of both experimental design and archival
data to test economic hypotheses may also be a fruitful model for future re-
search.
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